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In considering contemporary accounts of the interrelations of 
economic, legal and urban forms of social relations in the 
emergence of a global capitalist modernity, this paper argues that 
politico-juridical imaginaries of new forms of transnational 
universality have tended to be limited by virtue of both an 
anachronistic recourse to spatial models of the polis and a failure 
to confront the ineliminability of abstraction to any idea of global 
social interconnectivity. In such terms, it argues, Lefebvre?s 
famous call for a ?right to the city? needs to be reinscribed as a 
properly modern right to the metropolis; one that would allow us to 
conceive of the possibility of new kinds of relation between 
individual and collective subjectivity and the development of 
abstract social forms. 
The precise relationship between the emergence of modern law and the 
formation of capitalism has long been a central question for social, political, 
economic and legal theory. Classically, much Marxist thought has tended to 
relegate law to a mere question of ideological ‘superstructure’, while other veins 
have suggested a far more fundamental or ‘infrastructural’ connection between 
the development of modern legal forms and the establishment of distinctively 
capitalist commodity-exchange relations. Either way, at issue has been an 
ongoing question of how to understand the relationship between two forms of 
social relation that are generally taken to be definitive of modernity per se: the 
economic and the juridical. Today, it is the new claims to universality of such 
forms, in terms of their potential social significance and reach, that intersect 
with a massive surge of interest in the nature of international law, and in its role 
within an increasingly globalised capitalist modernity. For, while there are no 
doubt a number of more specific historical and political reasons for such a surge 
— the ‘war on terror’, the United States-led invasions of Afghanistan and Iraq, 
the celebrated Pinochet and Milosevic cases — it equally reflects the growing 
importance, across the humanities and social sciences as a whole, of some more 
fundamental questions about the form taken by the universality of the putatively 
‘international’ (or, perhaps more properly, ‘transnational’) itself within ‘our’ 
contemporary global moment.1 
                                                           
* Dr David Cunningham is Principal Lecturer, Department of English and Linguistics, 
University of Westminster. 
1 This surge of interest, then, is not confined to lawyers. Indeed, its most important 
aspect is precisely that it is not, but has rather taken on a profoundly cross-
disciplinary character — something already apparent in its increasing presence in 
the work of writers like Jürgen Habermas and John Rawls at the end of the 1990s. 
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In this article, I consider this in relation to some arguments concerning the 
specific role played by the urban in such processes of internationalisation, and 
hence raise certain questions about what implications its changing form may 
have for our understandings of legal and juridical space. As I argue below, much 
contemporary theory concerning the development of transnational structures has 
been marked, spatially, by what risks in fact being an anachronistic persistence 
of the idea of the polis in efforts to articulate, conceptually, emergent ‘real’ or 
‘speculative’ forms of universality or collectivity today. Politically, this has 
meant that attempts to mobilise — as a counter-force to current developments in 
international law and its accompanying conceptions of some (implicitly 
imperialist) ‘form of supra-state planetary authority’2 — the possibilities of a 
demand for something like a more radical, transnational right to the city have 
risked, at the same time, resorting to fundamentally arrière-garde (or at least 
merely romantic anti-capitalist) notions that fail to acknowledge the changing 
formations of the urban itself.  
Transnationalism, the Metropolis and Capital 
It is one of the key lessons of the work of Henri Lefebvre that a defining aspect 
of any new form of social relations is that it must precisely produce some new 
space. While, in principle, the speculative (and partially ‘real’) universality of 
international law is organised around the now potentially ‘limitless’ spatial 
reach of its jurisdiction, the possibility of a space of the ‘international’ which it 
presupposes is thus, by this account, a space which must itself also be (and have 
been) produced. Given its claim to universality, this might be usefully 
considered in relation to certain issues raised by one of Lefebvre’s own most 
influential concepts: the concept of abstract space — insofar as it is this concept 
that names the dominant spatial form of production of capitalist modernity in 
general, a social world that is, as Peter Osborne remarks, ‘constituted through 
abstraction to a hitherto unthinkable extent’.3 For while such abstraction is most 
definitively associated with what Marx terms the ‘real’ abstraction of the 
exchange value form, it is in principle no less relevant to an account of both the 
interrelated legal and urban spatial aspects of social modernity.  
Of course, at one level political, urban and legal form are, for a well-
established tradition of thought, inseparable. There is no law or politics without 
the city, insofar as it is, as Jean-Luc Nancy notes, ‘to the polis itself that the 
determined establishment, formulation, observation and improvement of law 
belongs’.4 Yet, if we follow Lefebvre himself, it is in fact historically more 
specifically Rome, not Athens, that via the ‘imposition of its juridical law (the 
Law) … [first] promoted abstraction to the rank of a law of thought’, thus 
uniquely providing a basis for its later ‘rediscovery’ as one key element in the 
formation of capitalism’s own abstract “space of accumulation”, in the 
                                                           
2 See Gowan (2001), p 81. 
3 Osborne (2000), p 18. 
4  Nancy (2007), p 6. 
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replacement of “customs” by “contractual (stipulated) relationships”’.5 In these 
terms, the Roman precedent simultaneously suggests both a complex and 
reciprocal interdependence between the real abstraction of the value form and 
certain forms of (re-)production of legal and urban reality, and indicates the 
obvious limits that must be set to any theoretical attempt to reconstruct the 
spatiality of modern law around the historically specific urban form of the polis. 
For while, in its production of a new ‘codified, law-based spatial practice’, 
Roman urban society may well have acted as ‘the generator of a new space … 
with a great future in Europe’, this could only manifest itself as a ‘necessary’ 
but not a ‘sufficient’ condition of later forms with the development of capitalist 
modernity proper.6 
For a dominant tradition of politico-juridical analysis, it is fair to say that a 
certain ‘abstraction’ is, of course, intrinsic to the social formation of modernity 
more generally. The emergence of a distinctively modern model of citizenship 
organised around the twin principles of universality and the individual citizen or 
human being — as opposed to the ancient (more or less mythical) model of the 
polis structured by ‘concrete’ and ‘particular’ communal affiliations — is thus 
often understood to have as its corollary the formation of an entirely new culture 
of abstraction, with the ‘abstract individual’ and his/her set of ‘abstract rights’ at 
its centre. The projected space of international law, the space that it produces, 
would thus certainly seem to be, in this sense and in exemplary fashion, that of 
abstract space. And if this allows, fairly obviously, for a linkage between the 
spatial forms of the abstraction of the law and that abstraction intrinsic to the 
dominance of commodity-exchange relations, it also engages the further 
question of the role played by the production of a certain form of specifically 
urban spatiality in the development of such processes today (a question worth 
posing if only as the basis for considering a different prism, through which to 
look at such processes, than that customarily provided by analyses of either new 
post-national state forms or forms of global ‘civil society’). For, in the famous 
account given by Simmel in 1903, it is above all in the modern metropolis that 
the ‘reality’ of modern forms of abstraction is manifested in an actual spatial 
form, as a ‘hollow[ing] out [of] the core of things, their individuality, their 
specific value, and their incomparability’, resulting from its domination by the 
money economy.7 The concept of metropolis thus appears historically here, not 
as a simple synonym for the city or polis, or the ancient lineage it represents, but 
on the contrary as the manifestation of a distinctively modern spatial-productive 
logic (of abstraction) which opposes and unsettles it. 
Pursuing this analysis today, two of the key issues at stake above might 
then be further developed as follows. 
                                                           
5  Lefebvre (1991), pp 246, 110, 290, 263. Interestingly, a similar claim is made by 
Lukács, with regard to Roman Law’s prefiguring of capitalist ‘legal patterns’. See 
Lukács (1971), p 97. 
6  Lefebvre (1991), p 252. 
7  Simmel (1997), pp 176, 178. For a further elaboration of this, see Cunningham 
(2005). 
CUNNINGHAM: SPACING ABSTRACTION 457 
The first issue concerns the role played by urban ‘centres’ within the global 
space of accumulation as a single, integral global economic network, and thus 
their relation to new politico-juridical spatialisations. As Saskia Sassen argues, 
while the ‘current phase of the world economy is in many respects 
discontinuous with the preceding periods’, spatially this qualitative 
transformation should not be ‘conceptualised’ only ‘in terms of the duality 
national-global where the latter gains at the expense of the former’.8 For if 
contemporary developments suggest ‘an incipient unbundling of the nation-
state’s exclusive authority over its territory’, Sassen’s own concept of the 
‘global city’ insists, nonetheless, upon the need to analyse new forms of the 
localisation of the spatial formations of globalisation on the terrain of the 
metropolis, which are ‘crucial in the valorisation, indeed overvalorisation, of 
leading sectors of capital’. This requires us both ‘to specify a geography of 
strategic places at the global scale, places bound to each other by the dynamics 
of economic globalisation’, and to recognise the emergence of ‘new legal 
regimes’ that create ‘operational and conceptual openings for other actors and 
subjects’.9 It is in light of the latter, Sassen argues, that some new ‘type of 
transnational politics is being localised in these cities’, which thus function as 
one of the key ‘nexuses where the formation of new claims materialises and 
assumes concrete forms’.10 
Yet the development of such a geography also revives the old question of 
the role played by the city in the ‘origins’, consolidation and spread of 
capitalism itself. Current speculation regarding whether ‘in a new phase of the 
world economy rival state structures to that of the nation-state are not tending to 
form again’, has thus — understandably — served to re-focus attention on 
earlier ‘transnational politico-commercial complex[es], centred around one or 
more cities’, such as the Hanseatic League.11 The contemporary production of 
new forms of transnationality similarly recalls our attention to the 
universalisation inherent in the value-form of capital itself — one that has, if we 
follow Simmel, a fundamental connection to the spatial production of the 
specific urban form of the metropolis — and to the fact that, from its 
beginnings, capitalism projected an ‘abstract space’ of the accumulation of 
value, of the ‘world market’, which has always been global in form. In the 
famous, and recently much quoted, words of The Communist Manifesto:  
                                                           
8  Sassen (1999), pp 86, 87. See also Sassen (1991), various essays in Knox and 
Taylor (1995) — in particular, the pivotal essay on ‘The World City Hypothesis’ by 
John Friedmann — and in Cox (1997). For a more recent study, see Massey (2007). 
9  Sassen (1999), pp 86, 92, 87, 88. 
10 Sassen (1999), pp 86, 87 [emphasis added]. 
11 Balibar (1991), pp 91, 89. As Balibar puts it elsewhere: ‘[T]here have in history 
been other state forms [than the nation-state] and even, potentially, other 
“bourgeois” state forms (such as the city-state or the Empire). And the problem of 
such alternative in no sense belongs to the past: the same forms, transformed to a 
greater or lesser extent, are reappearing today as “meta-national” forms.’ Balibar 
(2002), p 64. See also, for example, the vision of some ‘New Hanseatic League’ 
connecting together a globally dispersed network of ‘world city-states’ in Petrella 
(1991). 
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The need of a constantly expanding market for its products chases the 
bourgeoisie over the whole surface of the globe. It must nestle 
everywhere, settle everywhere, establish connexions everywhere. The 
bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a 
cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. 
… In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, 
we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of 
nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production.12 
This intrinsic compulsion to transcend the borders of the national is one 
that the period 1917–89 may now seem only to have obscured. Nonetheless, it is 
also true that the material possibilities of this universalisation have clearly been 
intensified and extended by their intersection with what is undoubtedly a 
qualitatively new spatial form — that of what Manuel Castells calls the ‘space 
of flows’, based in the new electronic communications and informational 
technologies.13 Not only is this ‘practically’ dependent on the new kinds of 
metropolitan form that Sassen defines — as necessary ‘nodes’ in the spatial 
distribution of a global economic and communicational network — but the 
emergence of this new spatiality itself appears to assume a kind of extended 
metropolitan form in its transcendence of ‘national seclusion and self-
sufficiency’. (It is not, I think, coincidental, in this sense, that the internet — 
with its IP addresses and network architecture — should continue to be imaged, 
as a form of space, in primarily urban terms.) Hence, for example, Deleuze and 
Guattari’s suggestion that ‘if it is the modern [nation] State that gives capitalism 
its models of realisation, what is thus realised is an independent, worldwide 
axiomatic that is like a single City, megalopolis, or “megamachine” of which 
the States are parts, or neighbourhoods’ — a suggestion that rests upon a 
definition of the urban as that which, in its modern form, ‘exists only as a 
function of circulation and circuits … a phenomenon of transconsistency’.14 
Today, then, the reconfigured urban form of the metropolis may be 
understood to ‘appear’ in two different forms, and at two different (but 
interrelated) levels: on the one hand, as the dispersed elements of a global 
interconnected network — a network that is constitutive of the particular form 
and ‘experience’ of any particular urban centre — and, on the other, as 
providing the basic, generalised form of that network itself, which is 
conceptually shaped as an historically new kind of, universally radiated, virtual 
metropolis (to borrow a phrase from the architect Rem Koolhaas). It is the 
reciprocal play between these different levels that defines the global urban 
problematic today, and thus the spatiality of any emergent ‘transnational 
politics’ organised around the urban as a theorist like Sassen defines it.  
Yet if the historical specificity of the metropolis is to be defined primarily 
in terms of its status as that which is ‘dominated’ by ‘the money economy’, this 
is not only a question of it providing something like the material support of 
                                                           
12  Marx and Engels (2002), p 223. 
13  Castells (1989).  
14  Deleuze and Guattari (1987), pp 434–35, 432. 
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monetary exchange, the necessary primary space ‘in’ which exchange takes 
place. This much is fairly obvious, and may be understood as the continuing 
basis, at a now more radically transnationally networked level, for someone like 
Sassen’s discussion of the global city. More than this, the metropolis must also 
be understood to designate the potentially universal processes by which space 
itself is produced by exchange. If money is the dominant modern form of the 
abstraction of social relations and contemporary experience, then the metropolis 
is not only its ‘backdrop’ or ‘setting’, but its socio-spatial equivalent or 
correlate. A certain abstract form of social relationality would, in this sense, 
simply be abstract space’s real ‘content’: the condition of a new urban-spatial 
logic of social connectivity and being-in-common — a ‘common content’ that is 
not pre-given (a simple abstraction out of what is there), but that is rather itself a 
kind of introjection and instantiation of this abstract form. Of course, as such it 
can still only attain ‘real existence’, and thus both specific and variable ‘form’ 
and ‘content’, by virtue of the specific spatial production of its open and 
dispersed totality of material assemblages. But, by contrast to the earlier forms 
of what Lefebvre terms ‘absolute’ and ‘historical’ space — in which, as in the 
polis, the ‘incomparability’ of the intrinsic qualities of certain sites remains 
seemingly essential — ‘specific values’ are no longer in the metropolis, in 
themselves, definitive of the urban as such, and are constitutively mediated by a 
pure form of exchangeability. This raises some key questions with regard to the 
kind of new transnational urban politics that Sassen envisages. For, from such a 
perspective, all politico-juridical demands for an effective restoration of the 
polis — as opposed to the metropolis — can thus appear only in the guise of a 
recourse to the residual oppositionality of so-called pre-capitalist cultural and 
social forms — the formation of a ‘rearguard’ action in the face of historical 
transformations in the reality of the urban itself. 
Capitalism and the Space of the Law 
There can be little question that it is the socio-economic processes of capitalist 
relations of production and exchange that have historically constituted, and 
continue to constitute, a specifically metropolitan spatiality. Nor is there any 
doubt that it is, in the context of ‘globalisation’, this general actuality of 
abstraction in the metropolis that is being universalised today, both by the 
emergence of a genuinely global ‘urban problematic’ such as Lefebvre already 
envisaged in the early 1970s — we inhabit a world in which more than 50 per 
cent of people now live in some form of urban space — and, more 
‘immaterially’, by the emergence of the new economic and communicational 
networks productive of a ‘virtual’ transnational metropolitan space, forming an 
emergent, immanently differentiated total process of urbanisation. 
Yet if the ongoing unfolding of this global ‘urban problematic’ continues to 
develop under the hegemony of capital, we should equally recognise that such 
hegemony is never, in itself, total or complete, and it is here that more 
specifically political and juridical issues begin to re-emerge. The more precise 
question needing to be asked thus concerns the relationship between the 
universality of the ‘real’ abstraction of the value form — as apparently the 
structuring abstraction of capitalist modernity — and the developing spatial 
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forms of both the modern metropolis and a speculative juridico-political horizon 
of the ‘international’ today, given the level of abstraction which would also 
seem intrinsic to both. If it seems clear at least that capital is, in Hegelian terms, 
something like ‘the “concrete universal” of our historical epoch’, in ‘that, while 
it remains a particular formation, it overdetermines all alternative formations, as 
well as all noneconomic strata of social life’,15 this universality, and the specific 
forms of real abstraction intrinsic to it, should not be mistaken for a simple 
process of homogenisation. In fact, it relies upon a certain immanent generation 
of difference internal to the production of abstract space itself, insofar as it must 
also spatially instantiate (crucially, through politico-juridical means) those 
economic relations of difference essential to the accumulation of value. Both 
what Mike Davis terms a ‘planet of slums’, and what others have commented 
upon under the (now somewhat anachronistic) notion of a distinctive ‘third 
world’ city space, are as much an outcome of this process as are Sassen’s global 
cities.16 This entails a recognition that if the current ‘planetary’ space of the 
international is not, finally, ‘a single world of human subjects’, but ‘solely one 
of things — objects for sale — and monetary signs’, then, as Alain Badiou has 
argued, the ‘overwhelming majority of the [global] population have at best 
restricted access to this world. They are locked out, often literally so.’17 But it 
also means that it would be wrong to thereby view the contemporary 
manifestation of, for example, the slum as a merely de-linked residue of some 
simple ‘space of place’, ‘left behind’ by the deterritorialising axiomatics of 
capitalist modernity.18 For the new proliferating slums of the global South are 
precisely linked to, and produced by, regimes of capital accumulation which 
have their ‘centres’ elsewhere, in New York, London or Tokyo. And what can 
(not always very accurately) often be regarded as a certain ‘lawlessness’ internal 
to such impoverished spaces — from the lack of clear property rights to the 
absence of a police force and effective judicial processes — is nonetheless 
determined and reproduced by a range of legal structures through which the 
‘flows’ of urban form and life are regulated at another level, one which both 
builds the ‘walls’ guaranteeing the exclusion of an ‘overwhelming majority’ 
from an unstriated international space, and establishes and upholds, within that 
space itself, the ‘universal medium’ of ‘a legally regulated market in which 
contracts are respected, and their breach punished’.19 Exclusion here is less 
‘external’ — as Badiou’s metaphor of ‘locking out’ might suggest — than it is 
‘internal’ or immanent (a ‘locking in’), part of the production of new global 
                                                           
15  Zizek (2004), p 185. 
16  See Davis (2006). At the very least, an insistence upon such immanent difference 
constitutes an important corrective to the preoccupation of Sassen and others with 
the ‘global city’ as the conceptual frame for theorising the distinctive character of 
advanced capitalist urban form. For a more radical argument concerning the need to 
overcome the very theoretical division often made between Western and ‘Third 
World’ cities, see Robinson (2005). 
17  Badiou (2008), p 38. 
18  See Cunningham (2007). 
19  Zizek (2004), p 197. 
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economic and social divisions within what is increasingly a single system or 
formation. (Such ‘immanence’ relates, of course, also to what Sassen, for one, 
has increasingly stressed as the importance of ‘the Third World city imported 
via immigration and located in dense groupings’ within the space of the global 
city itself, and hence of new forms of what Castells describes as an internal 
‘urban dualism’ in contemporary metropolises such as Los Angeles, New York 
or London.20) Thus, the political question that arises has to do less with these 
‘real’ forms of universality, or with their historical genealogy, than with the 
question of the speculative forms of universality that, from the ‘site’ of 
contemporary immanently differentiated metropolitan space, might be imagined 
as the basis of some transnational social interconnectedness in non-economic 
terms. This is, it seems to me, precisely the political question — indeed, the 
question of (the possibility of) politics — today, and one which partly explains 
the surge of interest in international law that I began by noting.  
As Balibar argues in Politics and the Other Scene, at least one way of 
defining what is at stake in something like an actual right to politics here — 
which, in a moment, I want to place alongside Lefebvre’s famous ‘right to the 
city’ — would be in terms of a familiar set of problems associated with the idea 
of citizenship. As Sassen argues — going on to situate this in terms of a 
capacity, via international law and human rights discourse, for ‘individuals to 
make claims on grounds that are not derived from the authority of the state’ — 
the emergence of a ‘new geography’ of global processes could well provide an 
opening for new forms of ‘citizenship’: 
The city has indeed emerged as a site for new claims, not only by global 
capital which uses the city as an ‘organizational commodity’, but also by 
disadvantaged sectors of the urban population, frequently as 
internationalised a presence in large cities as capital. The de-nationalising 
of urban space and the formation of new claims by international actors, 
raises anew the perennial question, ‘Whose city is it?’21 
Yet the link between changes in urban form and possible new forms of 
citizenship takes on a broader significance here also. For, as Balibar argues, it 
would seem that, to some degree by definition, ‘citizenship can exist only where 
we understand a notion of city to exist — where fellow citizens and foreigners 
are clearly distinguished in terms of rights and obligations in a given space … In 
this respect, the modern nation is still — and must still consider itself — a 
city’.22 
This seemingly ineradicable persistence of the spatial model of the city 
suggests, at this level, a continuity (conceptually imagined, at least) between 
ancient and modern ideas of citizenship, precisely formed around a certain 
                                                           
20  Saskia Sassen, ‘New York City’s Informal Economy’, cited in Castells (1989), p 
215. On the so-called ‘dual city’, see Castells (1989), pp 224–28, and for a more 
recent study focused specifically on London, see Massey (2007). 
21  Sassen (1999), pp 89, 88. 
22  Balibar (2002), p 108 [first emphasis added]. 
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principle of exclusion as definitive of a ‘given space’. The ongoing political and 
social implications of this are, as we have seen, obvious. But it also raises some 
particularly difficult questions about our very contemporary capacity to 
‘imagine’ properly transnational forms that could (even speculatively) operate at 
the same level of universality as the real abstraction of the value form, of the 
‘single world’ of ‘things’ and ‘monetary signs’. For if the nation still, in some 
sense, conceives of itself as a city (polis) — if this continues to mark a certain 
limit to what can be imagined for any ‘imagined community’ — then equally, as 
Balibar again observes: ‘Very often, the idea of supra-national citizenship has 
no meaning other than the displacement to a “higher” order of the very 
characteristics of national citizenship.’23 Which means that the ‘world’ must 
itself become a ‘city’ when viewed from the perspective of anything like a 
putative transnational citizenship constituting ‘a single world of human 
subjects’. Hence the degree to which professedly ‘postmodern’ urbanist 
conceptions of something like a coming cosmopolis, and the primary legalistic 
conceptions of liberal cosmopolitanism accompanying them, often seem 
themselves little more than an incoherent fantasy of a mythical polis 
‘universalised’ to some ‘cosmic’ level?24 At the very least, we would have to 
bear in mind here Marx and Engels’ words (cited above) that it is, above all, 
capitalism that has ‘given a cosmopolitan character to production and 
consumption in every country’. How to distinguish between the 
‘cosmopolitanism’ projected by some post-Kantian (or ‘post-structuralist’) 
global politics of difference and the ‘cosmopolitanism’ of capital itself, as 
manifested most intensely in the contemporary formation of the global 
metropolis, becomes a key question at this point. For it seems clear that while 
any ‘radical democracy’ today must seek to project some New 
International(ism), as Derrida calls it, the construction of a truly ‘“borderless 
world” in the juridico-political sense of the term’ would indeed, as Balibar 
argues, ‘run the risk of being a mere arena for the unfettered domination of the 
private centres of power which monopolise capital, communications and, 
perhaps also, arms’.25 
 This opens up a problem familiar from debates surrounding international 
law: the absence (perhaps essential structural ‘lack’) of any over-arching 
sovereignty through which some new transnational form of citizenship and 
juridico-political space might obviously be ‘grounded’, some ‘equivalent to the 
state and its Sittlichkeit [Hegel’s “ethical life”]’.26 If it is ‘to the polis itself that 
the determined establishment, formulation, observation and improvement of law 
[loi] belongs’, what does this mean for the possibility of ‘law’ in a globalised 
metropolitan world at the level of the global itself? (This, finally, is the question 
that Sassen’s own formulation of some new politics of the city fails to engage.) 
At the same time, the very persistence of the ‘model’ of the polis itself in the 
                                                           
23  Balibar (2002), p 107. 
24  See, for example, Sandercock (1998); Isin (1997).  
25  Balibar (2002), p 85. Or, as Deleuze and Guattari put it: ‘Never believe that a 
smooth space will suffice to save us.’ Deleuze and Guattari (1987), p 500. 
26  Balibar (2002), p 32. 
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contemporary political, philosophical and spatial imaginary of ‘the global’, 
raises the — to my mind — pivotal question of to what degree certain 
hegemonic conceptions and imaginaries in these kinds of debates about 
international law and citizenship are marked, fatally, by a profound failure to 
face the irreversible transformations in urban form and experience themselves 
designated by the concept of metropolis, as the name for a certain reality of 
abstract social form.  
The Right to the Metropolis 
It is in such terms that Lefebvre’s extraordinarily influential conception of a 
‘right to the city’ requires some fairly sober contemporary reinterrogation. What 
kind of right is this? What would be the ‘political’ and/or ‘legal’ form of those 
apparently new claims made by ‘city users’ or ‘urban actors’ who, as Sassen 
puts it, ‘struggle for recognition and entitlement’?27 Lefebvre is certainly clear 
that this can be regarded neither, in legal terms, as a natural nor as a contractual 
right: 
In the most ‘positive’ of terms it signifies the rights of citizens and city 
dwellers, and of groups they (on the basis of social relations) constitute, 
to appear on all the networks and circuits of communication, information 
and exchange … The right to the city legitimates the refusal to allow 
oneself to be removed from urban reality by a discriminatory and 
segregative organisation.28 
But if the right to the city is not to fall into the problems of a ‘right to 
politics’ organised around a particular model of ‘citizenship [that] can exist only 
where we understand a notion of city [polis] to exist’, the right to the city 
equally cannot be conceived of as ‘a simple visiting right or as a return to 
traditional cities’. Rather: ‘It can only be formulated as a transformed and 
renewed right to urban life’ as such where what is at stake is the possibility of 
new ‘places of simultaneity and encounters, places where exchange would not 
go through exchange value, commerce and profit’.29 Despite frequent 
misunderstanding, then, Lefebvre’s right to the city is, on his own terms, not one 
that can take the spatial model of the protected enclave — not a simple ‘city of 
refuge’, conceived of as a bulwark against the encroachment of the abstractions 
of exchange value or state power. For: ‘If it is true that the words and concepts 
“city”, “urban”, “space”, correspond to a global reality … the right to the city 
refers to the globality thus aimed at.’30 That is to say, it is the political and 
juridical horizon of the global that constitutes its fundamental metropolitan 
shape and problematic. Certainly this converges with Sassen’s more recent 
assertion that it is the ‘space constituted by the worldwide grid of global cities’, 
precisely by virtue of its ‘loosening of identities from what have been their 
                                                           
27  Sassen (1999), p 103. 
28  Lefebvre (1996), pp 194–95. 
29  Lefebvre (1996), pp 158 [emphasis added], 148. 
30  Lefebvre (1996), p 194. 
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traditional sources, namely the nation or the village’ — and, I would add, the 
polis — ‘that is today one of the most crucial spaces for the formation of 
transnational identities and communities’.31 
‘New social relationships call for a new space’, as Lefebvre famously 
asserts. As a form of ‘globality’ that is ‘aimed at’, the right to the city must then 
be governed by the possibility of a qualitatively different non-capitalist form of 
social-spatial relationality. This is the vision elaborated in what, of course, he 
terms differential space: the ‘seeds of a new space’ harboured by abstract 
space’s ‘specific contradictions’. As the legal theorist Chris Butler summarises: 
‘The characteristic of the urban as a space of encounter [for Lefebvre] allows 
differences to flourish and generates the contemporary conditions for creative 
human communities. Groups and individuals who are prevented from 
participating in this collective, creative act, are denied the right to the city.’32 
The contemporary metropolis, globally, is in this sense the ‘site’ of a necessary 
and irreducible conflict, in which forms of social struggle increasingly find 
themselves organised around a will ‘to differentiate, to generate differences 
which are not intrinsic to economic growth qua strategy, “logic” or “system”’.33 
It is this, for one thing, that would lend a new significance to Deleuze and 
Guattari’s suggestion, already cited, that ‘if it is the modern [nation] State that 
gives capitalism its models of realisation, what is thus realised is an 
independent, worldwide axiomatic that is like a single City, [a] megalopolis’. 
Yet if such realisation is — barring global environmental catastrophe — 
strictly irreversible, this also surely raises the question of whether ‘abstraction’ 
itself can be thought so clearly as what should be speculatively overcome in 
contemporary struggles, as Lefebvre can tend to imply, or whether this simply 
leads one into a kind of logical and political incoherence. For, as I have 
suggested elsewhere, the real question today, both for practical politics and for 
legal theory, might be one of whether it is possible to conceive of an alternate 
relationship between difference and abstraction than that constituted by the 
value form as it is manifested on the terrain of contemporary metropolitan life.34 
For would not a certain abstract space be itself the condition, or indeed 
necessary form, of such a differential space? Indeed, without certain structures 
and experiences of abstraction, would any such space of a differential 
connectivity or social ‘unity’ be conceivable at all? This suggests that the very 
received opposition between the ‘abstract’ and ‘concrete’ would need rethinking 
at this point, as would a certain still hegemonic political and critical-legal 
discourse that rests upon it. For abstract space is itself a positive ‘site’ of the 
production of experience, constitutive of new ‘concrete’ forms of spatial 
relationality generative of social meaning. It is not simply, as is implied in much 
reception of Lefebvre’s work, a mere representational form of conceptual 
masking or misrecognition of some underlying ‘content’ of a more real, multiple 
                                                           
31  Sassen (1999), p 102 [emphasis added]. 
32  Butler (2007), p 214. 
33  Lefebvre (1991), p 55. 
34  See Cunningham (2005).  
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and concrete ‘lived experience’. (Indeed, is it not precisely as ‘lived experience’ 
that we most obviously ‘inhabit’ abstraction today?) 
How then, finally, does the ‘positive’ form of the right to the city, as a 
global reality, relate to the form of the law? Critics of contemporary 
international law and human rights discourse, like China Miéville, are 
unquestionably right that ‘systematic amelioration of social and international 
problems cannot come through law’.35 (It is in this, I think, that Sassen’s vision 
of a new transnational urban politics rooted specifically in the ‘ascendance of 
international human rights’ can certainly seem naïve.) At best, it provides a 
partial and fragile ‘protection’ against certain specific encroachments: as, for 
example, in the resistance to ‘slum clearances’ in both the so-called developing 
and developed world.36 As the geographer David Harvey says, then, the clear 
temptation ‘is to eschew all appeal to universals as fatally flawed and to 
abandon all mention of rights as an untenable imposition of abstract ethics as a 
mask for the restoration of class power’. Nonetheless, as he rightly continues, 
one must equally wonder just how wise it actually is ‘to abandon this field to 
neo-liberal hegemony’. For there is: 
a battle to be fought not only over which universals and what rights shall 
be invoked in particular situations but also over how universal principles 
and conceptions of rights shall be constructed … If class restoration 
entails the imposition of a distinctive set of rights, then resistance to that 
imposition entails struggles for entirely different rights.37 
Just as importantly, at the level of the ‘theoretical’ itself, one needs still to 
distinguish here between two different problematics of abstraction customarily 
invoked in critiques of international law and of rights discourse more generally. 
On the one hand, it is true that ‘law’, in this regard and ‘in itself’, is inherently 
                                                           
35  Miéville (2006), p 318. 
36  This, of course, raises a further issue that, for reasons of space, I have largely had to 
bypass in this article — though I return to it a little obliquely in the final two 
paragraphs as a question of an urban politics ‘from below’ — that is, the potential 
and limits of what is most usually termed a grassroots politics in effecting radical 
political change. (For a now classic, and still compelling, account of this, see 
Castells, 1983.) It is at least clear that the unique difficulty facing grassroots 
struggles today concerns their capacity, as David Harvey puts it in a recent book, to 
extract themselves ‘from the local and the particular to understand the macro-
politics of what neo-liberal accumulation by dispossession was and is all about’. 
‘The variety of such struggles was and is simply stunning,’ Harvey continues. ‘It is 
hard to even imagine connections between them’. Harvey (2006), p 63. There is 
something slightly odd about the idea of an understanding of ‘macro-politics’ as 
some revolutionary prerequisite here. But the point is fairly obvious. Hence, as I 
argue throughout, the ineliminability of a certain problematic of abstraction in all 
attempts to ‘imagine connections’ at what now seems the necessary level of a 
genuinely global urban problematic. For some more detailed comments on this, see 
Cunningham (2007). 
37  Harvey (2006), p 54. 
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limited insofar as it can only, precisely, exemplify the practically ‘bad’ 
abstraction of what Osborne calls ‘the merely empirical “reality” of the 
[conceptually] one-sided abstractions of the understanding [Verstand] … an 
empiricism of [existing] everyday economic, legal and political life’.38 Law, that 
is to say, is — as a specific form of abstraction — necessarily a form of 
misrecognition at some level, and as such practically functions quite differently 
from the ‘concretely abstract’ form of capital, viewed as an actually universal 
global form of social mediation today. And it presumably cannot do otherwise, 
cannot, to put it another way, bridge the gap, in its own capacity, between ‘the 
[abstract] “right” and the “duty” of its enforcement’.39 This is why, in the end, 
any idea of international law as something like the ‘political’ counterbalance to 
the ‘economic’ form of a globalised value form is always destined to naivety or 
self-deception, even in its most well-intentioned articulations.40  
At the same time, however, it does not necessarily follow from this that the 
speculative horizon of some ‘withering away’ of law per se would thus be either 
possible or desirable (even as a kind of regulating idea). This is not to argue that 
‘international law’ as it exists is in some way ‘reformable’ to make it more truly 
‘humanist’ or ‘universal’ in its practice. Nor, most importantly, is it to deny 
Miéville’s central point that force and violence are intrinsic to the legal form as 
such. It is rather to question whether some regulative idea of the end of 
‘violence’ itself, and the desire to have done with abstraction per se that may be 
implied by it, would be the most productive position from which to start out 
here, or whether it risks simply opening up an invitation to the worst possible 
violence of what Balibar describes as ‘a mere arena for the unfettered 
domination of the private centres of power’. For, as Balibar also states, ‘there is 
no society (no viable or livable) society [including urban society] without 
institutions and counter-institutions’, and no politics which can, in truth, 
‘suppress’ all violence, only one which might work to exclude ‘extremes of 
violence, so as to create a (public, private) space for politics (emancipation, 
transformation), and enable violence itself to be historicised’.41 Most 
importantly, if the political question today is whether it is possible to conceive 
of equally universal forms of global social mediation to those established by that 
‘real’ form of universality which is the value form, and if it is the very 
abstractness of the value form that is the condition of that universality’s 
                                                           
38  Osborne (2004), p 27. 
39  Chandler (2003), p 27. 
40  Similarly, if the right to the urban were to be conceived of simply as a quasi-utopian 
‘political’ overcoming of the forms of division generated by the ‘real’ ‘economic’ 
relations of production, the early Castells’ Althusser-influenced accusation that 
Lefebvre merely constructs an ideology of urban society would evidently have some 
plausibility. See Castells (1977). However, as I suggest below, this does not seem to 
me the only way of thinking what is at stake here. 
41  Balibar (2002), pp 29, 30. This may also no doubt be connected to Derrida’s 
assertion of a need for the ‘critique of institutions, but one that sets out not from the 
utopia of a wild and spontaneous pre- or non-institution, but rather from counter-
institutions’. Derrida (2001), p 50. 
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‘reality’, does this not beg the question of whether any competing or alternate 
form of equal universality would not have to be equally abstract too? For is it in 
fact possible to imagine some form of urban–social connectivity at a global 
scale that would not involve forms of social abstraction in some manner? In 
which case, the simple criticism of the violence of abstraction per se (rather than 
of the historically specific forms of violence as domination that it generates 
under certain conditions) would make little sense here; indeed, it would operate 
as a profound block on any plausible contemporary metropolitan politics of 
emancipation and transformation.42  
It is, in this sense, that — speculatively — a politics adequate to the 
contemporary must always go beyond the terrain of the ‘legal’, but equally 
cannot afford to ‘eradicate’ it, for this would risk merely reinscribing rights, in 
an illusory desire for the ‘concrete’, as a purely ‘moral’ category divided from 
questions of political accountability or enforceability.43 The continuing violence 
and ‘Eurocentrism’ of international law that is reproduced through the simple 
fact that the transnational ‘humanity’, which is supposedly ‘covered’ by such 
law, can have no say in either its writing or application cannot be ‘resolved’ by 
law itself. Indeed, as much to the point, what would seem today to render any 
talk of rights near delusional per se is not the dilemmas surrounding social 
forms of abstraction or the demand for ‘universality’ as such, but the extreme, 
practical limits to much of the world’s population conceiving of themselves as 
anything like political subjects in this way. 
It is here that the idea of a right to the urban reveals both its possibilities 
and its immense difficulties. For if we accept, with Lefebvre, that the 
‘characteristic of the urban as a space of encounter allows differences to flourish 
and generates the contemporary conditions for creative human communities’, as 
a progressively global reality it may well be what is generated by the spatial 
development of the metropolis that does indeed offer some grounds for some 
hope that we might conceive of other forms of collectivity than those 
determined by the value form. At the very least, this compels us to ask how we 
might conceive today what the World Charter of the Rights to the City, drawn 
up at the Social Forum of the Americas in 2004, posits as the potential of the 
urban, while recognising, as the Charter acknowledges, that if the social 
divisions of the metropolis favour ‘the emergence of urban conflict’, its 
contemporary formations also mean that this is ‘usually fragmented’.44 To put 
this another way, it entails the question of how, beyond the actions of any 
‘master’ (acting on behalf of the law), a demand for a right to such potential of 
the urban might be made, practically, ‘from below’ by the efforts of new 
collectivities themselves.  
                                                           
42  Osborne (2004), pp 27–28. 
43  As Bruce Robbins baldly puts it: ‘Whatever a left counterpart to liberal 
cosmopolitanism may be (if such a creature exists), it must flee the self-sacrificing 
romanticism of lost causes and seek the power to implement its ideas’. Robbins 
(2002), p 32. 
44 World Charter of the Rights to the City, 
www.choike.org/nuevo_eng/informes/2243.html.  
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This is, of course, the theme that has come to be named in our time by the 
concept of the multitude; not insignificantly, its greatest proponent, Antonio 
Negri, has recently turned towards the ‘antagonistic’ spatial configuration of the 
metropolis as that which might occupy a privileged ‘place’ in the multitude’s 
‘construction of new circuits of communication [and] new forms of social 
collaboration’, and thus the signs of a struggle against the imperial ‘bad 
abstraction’ of abstract space. Here, as with Lefebvre, the question is: ‘If the 
metropolis is invested by the capitalist relation of valorisation and exploitation, 
how can we grasp, inside it, the antagonism of the metropolitan multitude?’45 
Yet, it seems to me, much recent attempts to substantialise the ‘promise’ of the 
multitude, including those of Negri and Michael Hardt, have been stymied by 
what still appears tied to a futurally projected idea of difference that would 
somehow lie beyond abstraction per se. (The Deleuzian ontologisation of the 
positivity of ‘living labour’, in the figure of the multitude, as the creative force 
of ‘autonomous power’ would appear, from this perspective, only to effectively 
bracket the problem of forms of social mediation and of the relation of the 
multitude to the ‘rhizomatic’ form of capitalist Empire, for all that Hardt and 
Negri accord great attention to ‘organisational’ questions of the network, etc.) In 
this light, it is not so surprising that, despite the radicalism of its commitment to 
a ‘molecular politics’, Empire should itself precisely conclude with the demand 
for a series of universal rights (to global citizenship, to a social wage, to 
reappropriation).46 If this suggests the ineliminability of a certain modern 
politico-juridical framework, it also suggests something that may be more 
important — that it is, in fact, only perhaps in thinking the possibility of new 
kinds of relation between individual and collective subjectivity and the 
development of abstract social forms that we might begin to glimpse the 
lineaments of a metropolitics adequate to that demand for the right to the urban 
which compels ‘us’ today. 
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